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Abstract
The social scientific analysis of social class is attracting renewed interest given the accentuation 
of economic and social inequalities throughout the world. The most widely validated measure of 
social class, the Nuffield class schema, developed in the 1970s, was codified in the UK’s National 
Statistics Socio-Economic Classification (NS-SEC) and places people in one of seven main classes 
according to their occupation and employment status. This principally distinguishes between 
people working in routine or semi-routine occupations employed on a ‘labour contract’ on the 
one hand, and those working in professional or managerial occupations employed on a ‘service 
contract’ on the other. However, this occupationally based class schema does not effectively 
capture the role of social and cultural processes in generating class divisions. We analyse the 
largest survey of social class ever conducted in the UK, the BBC’s 2011 Great British Class 
Survey, with 161,400 web respondents, as well as a nationally representative sample survey, 
which includes unusually detailed questions asked on social, cultural and economic capital. Using 
latent class analysis on these variables, we derive seven classes. We demonstrate the existence 
of an ‘elite’, whose wealth separates them from an established middle class, as well as a class 
of technical experts and a class of ‘new affluent’ workers. We also show that at the lower 
levels of the class structure, alongside an ageing traditional working class, there is a ‘precariat’ 
characterised by very low levels of capital, and a group of emergent service workers. We think 
that this new seven class model recognises both social polarisation in British society and class 
fragmentation in its middle layers, and will attract enormous interest from a wide social scientific 
community in offering an up-to-date multi-dimensional model of social class.
Keywords
cultural capital, latent class analysis, social class
Over the past decade, there has been a striking renewal of interest in the analysis of social 
class inequality, driven by accumulating evidence of escalating social inequalities, notably 
with respect to wealth and income, but also around numerous social and cultural indicators, 
such as mortality rates, educational attainment, housing conditions and forms of leisure 
participation (e.g. Bennett et al., 2008; Dorling, 2011; Hills, 2010; Wilkinson and Pickett, 
2008). Theoretically, this interest has been influenced by the deployment of Pierre 
Bourdieu’s conceptual armoury to elaborate a model of class linked not exclusively to 
employment inequalities, but to the interplay between economic, social and cultural capital 
(see Bennett et al., 2008; Crompton, 2008; Savage, 2010; Savage et al., 2005). This current 
of work, sometimes called ‘cultural class analysis’ (Atkinson, 2010) has cross-fertilised 
with feminist currents (e.g. Adkins and Skeggs, 2005; Skeggs, 1997) to champion multi-
dimensional approaches to the analysis of stratification (Yuval-Davis, 2011).
This article contributes to this current by elaborating a new model of social class 
which shows how measures of economic, cultural and social capital can be combined to 
provide a powerful way of mapping contemporary class divisions in the UK. We analyse 
the largest survey of social class ever conducted in the UK, the BBC’s Great British 
Class Survey (GBCS), a web survey with the unusually high number of 161,400 respond-
ents, complemented by a parallel national representative survey. Using these two surveys 
in tandem allows us to provide unusual detail on the link between class and specific 
occupational, educational and geographical profiles which offer unparalleled insights 
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into the organisation of class inequality in 2011–12. We will show that although a large 
‘rump’ of the established middle (or ‘service’) class, and the traditional working class 
exists, there are five other classes which fit less easily into this conventional sociological 
framing, and which reveal the extent of social polarisation and class fragmentation in 
contemporary Britain.
Our analysis proceeds in five steps. Firstly, we discuss how our analysis represents a 
new phase in class analysis. Secondly, we introduce the two surveys. Thirdly, we explain 
our measures of economic, cultural and social capital. Fourthly, and most importantly, 
we explain how we combined our measures of the three capitals, using latent class analy-
sis, to generate our new model of social class. Finally, we describe and explicate each of 
our seven classes, showing how they intersect with age and gender divisions, drawing 
out their specific occupational and educational profiles. In our conclusion we draw out 
our findings for the analysis of social class.
What Is Social Class?
We are now entering a third phase in the analysis of class and stratification. The first 
phase, which lasted to the 1980s, saw the dominance of ‘moralising’ official measures of 
class, enshrined in Britain in the Registrar General’s Class schema, in which ‘standing 
within the community’ (replaced, at least nominally, by ‘skill’ in 1980) was used to draw 
a six-fold class schema, with professionals at the top, and unskilled manual workers at 
the bottom (see Szreter, 1984). In this period, sociological endeavour focused on criti-
quing these models in favour of more rigorous sociologically informed class schemas, 
variously deploying theoretical frameworks from Marx and Weber.
The second phase, from the 1970s, saw the triumph of this sociological critique, 
especially in the elaboration of the influential model of social class developed by John 
Goldthorpe and his associates at Nuffield College, Oxford University (Erikson and 
Goldthorpe, 1992; Goldthorpe and Marshall, 1992; Goldthorpe et al., 1980; Marshall 
et al., 1988). Seeing off the rival Marxist framework of Erik Olin Wright (1985), the 
Erikson–Goldthorpe–Portocarero (EGP) model proved highly influential. This 
defined seven classes according to an individual’s employment position.1 It funda-
mentally differentiated between employees and employers and, amongst the former, 
between those on a labour contract (routine, semi-routine, technical employees),2 and 
those in a more diffuse ‘service relationship’ with their employers (professionals and 
managers).
This class schema proved hugely influential in the overhaul of the official UK class 
schema, through the elaboration of the National Statistics Socio-Economic Classification 
(NS-SEC) (Rose and O’Reilly, 1998; Rose and Pevalin, 2003). It has also been very 
important in the development of cross-national schemes for comparative analysis (e.g. 
Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992; Rose and Harrison, 2007, 2010). The Goldthorpe class 
schema has rightly been of enormous significance, especially in the comparative analysis 
of social mobility. However, although it is clear that for certain purposes it continues to 
represent a ‘gold standard’ in the measurement of class, five main lines of criticism can 
be developed to point to ways in which its purview is limited.
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Firstly, as a deductive class schema, the validation of the Goldthorpe class schema 
predominantly focuses on criterion validity, that is to say, the extent to which it meas-
ures those features of the employment relations which are held to define class rela-
tionships (Evans and Mills, 2000).3 Whilst it does this reasonably well (e.g. McGovern 
et al., 2007), the schema has been shown to be of less use in explicating the wider 
cultural and social activities and identities (see generally Devine, 1998; Savage, 
2000), which do not appear to be closely linked to people’s class position, as defined 
by the Goldthorpe class schema, and alternative schemas have been proposed to 
explain patterns of cultural consumption (Le Roux et al., 2008). Indeed, this point is 
recognised by Goldthorpe himself in his recent work with Chan which emphasises 
that the link between class and cultural consumption is limited (Chan and Goldthorpe, 
2007a, 2007b, 2007c).
Secondly, it is increasingly apparent that a major appeal of the schema lay as a prag-
matic means of placing individuals into social classes using standard nationally repre-
sentative surveys with a moderate sample size. This is especially important since 
preferred forms of categorical data analysis such as log-linear modelling required rea-
sonable cell sizes.4 It is for these pragmatic reasons, for instance, that an ‘elite’ was not 
distinguished (see Penn, 1981) within the Goldthorpe class schema (see the discussion in 
Savage and Williams, 2008). Recently, however, Grusky and his colleagues have used 
surveys with larger samples to show quite distinctive differences between ‘micro-classes’ 
(Butler and Savage, 1995; Devine, 2010; Grusky and Weeden, 2001, 2008; Savage et al., 
1992; Weeden and Grusky, 2005; 2012). It might thus be argued that Goldthorpe’s class 
schema is dependent on the hegemony of a particular model of the nationally representa-
tive sample survey (see Savage, 2010).
Thirdly, Goldthorpe adopted the standard sociological approach of abstracting class 
from measures of income and wealth in order to derive class from measures of employ-
ment. However, this analytical step has increasingly been criticised by economists who 
examine moves between income groups, rather than occupational classes, to measure 
changing patterns of social mobility (Blanden and Machin, 2008; Blanden et al., 2004; 
Jenkins, 2011). Although Erikson and Goldthorpe (2010) have mounted a powerful 
defence of the value of occupational class measures, nonetheless it is possible that  that 
income variation within occupations is growing and that if economic measures of ine-
quality are to be kept within the purview of class analysis we need to go beyond meas-
ures of occupational class alone.
Fourthly, as feminist critics such as Crompton (2008), Skeggs (1997, 2004), and 
Bradley (1995) have insisted, a focus on occupations as the sole measure of class occludes 
the more complex ways that class operates symbolically and culturally, through forms of 
stigmatisation and marking of personhood and value. Such an appreciation requires a 
more culturally sensitive mode of analysis.
Fifth, although widely used in comparative studies of social mobility, the validity of 
the EGP scheme has been challenged. Recently, based on a comparative study of Britain, 
Germany, Sweden and Switzerland, Daniel Oesch (2006) questions several of the assump-
tions in the EGP scheme for lacking the ability to take highly important horizontal cleav-
ages into account, for giving a too homogenous description of the salaried middle class 
and for overdoing the manual/non-manual divide when separating between male 
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production workers and routine sales and service occupations. Comparative studies of 
industrial organisations (e.g. Maurice et al., 1986[1982]) also show that there are real 
cross-national differences with respect to qualification levels, job autonomy, career pros-
pects (i.e. social mobility), organisation of production, etc. Two formally identical catego-
ries, e.g. ‘skilled worker’ or ‘supervisor’, may thus refer to clearly different occupational 
realities in the countries that are compared. Whereas this problem is acknowledged by 
Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992: 52), its fundamental implications are even so disregarded 
in the construction of the EGP scheme.
All these factors explain the appeal of developing a new, multi-dimensional way of 
registering social class differentiation. A highly influential scheme is that developed by 
French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu (1984), which argues that there are three different 
kinds of capital, each of which conveys certain advantages. He differentiates between (1) 
economic capital (wealth and income), (2) cultural capital (the ability to appreciate and 
engage with cultural goods, and credentials institutionalised through educational suc-
cess), and (3) social capital (contacts and connections which allow people to draw on 
their social networks). Bourdieu’s point is that although these three capitals may overlap, 
they are also subtly different, and that it is possible to draw fine-grained distinctions 
between people with different stocks of each of the three capitals, to provide a much 
more complex model of social class than is currently used. This recognition that social 
class is a multi-dimensional construct indicates that classes are not merely economic 
phenomena but are also profoundly concerned with forms of social reproduction and 
cultural distinction (Devine, 2004; Savage et al., 2005),5 a perspective indeed used by 
some researchers working with the Goldthorpe class schema (e.g. Breen and Yaish, 2006; 
Sullivan, 2007). This allows us to reassert an interest in the classical Weberian problem-
atic of ‘class formation’, through an examination of how stocks of the three capitals 
might combine to generate distinctive class boundaries.
Bourdieu’s interventions have led to influential sociological studies across different 
nations (Bennett et al., 2001, on Australia; Bennett et al., 2008, on the UK; Lamont, 
1992, on the US and France). Hitherto, its application has been limited because compre-
hensive questions on cultural and social capital are rarely asked on national surveys. In 
addition, a large sample size is needed to unravel the interactions between these three 
capitals. It is therefore a major step forward that the BBC’s Lab UK, in collaboration 
with its Current Affairs Department, decided in 2009 to commission a major web survey 
on social class. The BBC has been running interactive web surveys since 2001 and 
launched Lab UK in 2009 to host them. Most of the surveys to date have been oriented 
towards psychology, and the fact that they chose this as their first major sociological 
topic is itself a comment on the public renewal of interest in class. Our interest in col-
laborating with the BBC was linked to our view that sociologists need to be open to the 
possibility that innovations in digital data might provide valuable resources for socio-
logical analysis (Savage and Burrows, 2007).
The Great British Class Survey (GBCS)
The GBCS was designed to include questions to develop detailed measures of eco-
nomic, cultural and social capitals. Its questions on cultural capital asked about 
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people’s leisure interests, musical tastes, use of the media, and food preferences. 
Many of the questions were similar to those used on the Cultural Capital and Social 
Exclusion survey (Bennett et al., 2008), the most sophisticated study of cultural capi-
tal ever conducted in Britain, which has influenced numerous other studies across 
Europe (e.g. Prieur and Savage, 2011). The questions on social capital mainly take the 
form of ‘position generator’ developed by the American sociologist Nan Lin (2001) 
to measure the range of people’s social ties. We asked respondents whether they knew 
anyone in 37 different occupations, which is the most complex and granular question 
of its type ever used in social research in any part of the world. The questions on eco-
nomic capital asked not only about household income, but also savings and the value 
of owner-occupied housing, so allowing unusually detailed measures of economic 
capital. We also obtained extensive information about household composition, educa-
tion, social mobility and political attitudes, to contextualise our measures of cultural, 
economic and social capital.
The web survey was launched on 26 January 2011, with extensive publicity across BBC 
television and radio, and newspaper coverage. Responses were enthusiastic and, by July 
2011, 161,400 complete surveys had been submitted. However, examination of the data 
revealed that the GBCS web survey suffered from a strong selection bias, with respondents 
being predominantly drawn from the well-educated social groups. As one BBC journalist 
told us when we reported this problem, ‘yes, you seem to have got a typical BBC news 
audience there’. To address this problem, the BBC therefore agreed to conduct a separate, 
nationally representative face-to-face survey using identical questions. This survey, with 
1026 respondents, was conducted using quota sampling methods by the well-known sur-
vey firm GfK in April 2011. Tests from its field division and by ourselves indicate that its 
demographics are nationally representative. In this article we refer to the nationally repre-
sentative survey as GfK and the web survey as GBCS.
Table 1 indicates the difference in the proportions of social class between these two 
surveys.6 Traditional professions are massively over-represented in the GBCS compared 
Table 1. Proportions in occupational classes from GBCS web survey and GfK nationally 
representative surveys.
Category/group in % Web sample National sample Ratio
Senior manager 13.0 6.3 2.1
Traditional professional 17.9 4.8 3.7
Modern professional 31.5 18.1 1.7
Middle/Junior manager 8.1 6.7 1.2
Intermediate 11.0 14.7 0.7
Technical craft worker 2.4 10.6 0.2
Semi-routine worker 4.9 15.3 0.3
Routine worker 3.2 14.5 0.2
Never worked 7.8 8.3 0.9
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to the national figures from GfK, and senior managers and modern professionals are 
significantly over-represented. All manual workers are massively under-represented. 
Furthermore, comparisons with the Culture, Class, Distinction (Bennett et al., 2008) 
study showed that it was not possible to simply weight the GBCS to deal with these 
skews because the GBCS respondents from routine classes turn out to be highly unrep-
resentative of their peers in these classes. They possess relatively more cultural and 
social capital than their peers, and indeed the very act of participating in the GBCS was 
a ‘performative’ way of claiming cultural stakes (as discussed by Bourdieu, 1984; 
Skeggs, 2004). Let us be clear, therefore, that GBCS alone cannot be used to derive a 
representative model of class. However, as we explain in section 4, by linking it to the 
GfK survey, we can overcome this problem in a way that allows us to combine nationally 
representative classes with the detailed educational, occupational and geographical pro-
files from the GBCS.
Measuring Social, Cultural and Economic Capital
A key first stage of our analysis was to use the GfK to examine the different questions 
probing economic, social and cultural capital in order to develop the most robust sum-
mary measures for each which we could then use to develop our new model of class.
Social Capital
The 37 occupations which respondents might report contacts with were coded to the 
widely validated Cambridge Social Interaction and Stratification (CAMSIS) scale, so 
that for every individual respondent we were able to assess how many of the 37 occupa-
tions they reported, the mean status scores of the occupations of their contacts (where the 
scores range from 85.3, the highest, to 4.5, the lowest), and their range (the extent of the 
difference between the highest and lowest status scores). This is the most elaborate data 
ever collected in the UK on this issue. Table 2 reports these figures, omitting contacts 
who are students, who have never worked, and who are aristocrats (the categories have 
no CAMSIS scores).
Table 2 shows that the average respondent knows socially someone in 13.3 out of the 
34 ‘valid’ occupations that are asked about. The mean status score of their contacts is 
40.9 and the mean range (the difference between the highest and the lowest of the scores 
of their contacts) is 62.4.
In our measures for social capital we used only two of these. We omitted ‘range’ 
because it is strongly correlated with number of contacts identified (if one knows more 
people, then this is likely to entail that the range will be greater). To summarise, our 
measures of social capital are as follows:
1 We used the mean status score of the occupations that respondents know (the 
higher the score, the higher the average status of the social contacts).
2 The mean number of social contacts reported (the higher the score, the more of 
the 34 occupations which are known).
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Cultural Capital
The analysis of cultural capital is complex, and we do not have the scope in this article 
to enter the now extensive debate on its definition and measurement (though see Bennett 
et al., 2008; Prieur and Savage, 2011). Bourdieu (1984) differentiates between ‘high’ 
culture, associated with the arts, and ‘popular’ culture, but the clarity of this distinction 
has been questioned in much recent research (e.g. Bennett et al., 2008; Prieur and Savage, 
2011; Warde and Gayo-Cal, 2009). In particular, it has been argued that elite culture has 
become more liberal and tolerant as the middle and upper classes have become more 
‘omnivorous’, keen to partake of both highbrow and popular cultural forms.
We therefore needed to carry out an inductive analysis of cultural taste to reveal the 
patterning of activity without assuming a priori that certain kinds of activities were more 
‘highbrow’ than others. Here, in line with other comparable studies (Bennett et al., 2008), 
we conducted a specific multiple correspondence analysis (MCA)7 on 27 cultural varia-
bles on the nationally representative GfK to assess the structuring of cultural divisions.
In Figure 1, modalities represent leisure, musical, eating and holiday preferences. 
Those modalities with a + sign afterwards indicate that this activity is liked, or engaged 
in, and those with a minus (−) after it indicate that it is disliked or not engaged in. For the 
eating variables, L indicates liking, D indicates disliking. Finally, the size of the point is 
related to the frequencies of that variable amongst the sample (hence, liking shopping 
‘shop+’ is much more common that going regularly to the theatre, ‘theatre+’).
Figure 1 shows that the first (x) axis differentiates the culturally disengaged from the 
engaged (on the left). Thus, we see most of the variables on the left with a + sign, and 
with those on the right having a negative sign. On the second ‘y’ axis of Figure 1, we can 
also distinguish, at the top, those interested in ‘highbrow’ cultural forms and, at the bot-
tom, those attracted to popular forms of culture associated with sport, using information 
technology, and popular and contemporary music. This second axis indicates that there 
are now two main types of cultural capital: that associated with highbrow taste, and what 
we term ‘emerging’ cultural capital. Both of these are differentiated from those who are 
less culturally engaged on the measures that we use in the survey.8 Figure 2 superimposes 
three socio-demographic variables onto this cultural space: age, class of respondent and 
of main earner when the respondent was a child. It shows that the first axis is clearly 
aligned with social class, with the routine classes located on the disengaged right hand 
side of the y axis, whilst age distinguishes the middle-aged and elderly ‘highbrows’ from 
the more youthful middle classes attracted to ‘emerging’ cultural capital. This finding is 
consistent with other research on cultural engagement (e.g. Bennett et al., 2008) and 
Table 2. Summary statistics for social capital in the GBCS and GfK surveys.
GBCS – mean GBCS – σ GfK – mean GfK – σ
Number of occupations reported 13.2 5.5 13.3 7.1
Mean status score of reported 
occupations
50.2 8.9 40.9 9.7
Range of reported occupations 62.9 13.3 62.4 17.9
Source: GfK and GBCS surveys.
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points to the need to distinguish two different modes of cultural capital that do not neces-
sarily overlap.9
In our following analysis, we use the two measures of cultural capital in accordance 
with our MCA (Table 3). We have a measure of ‘highbrow’ cultural capital, which scores 
the extent of respondents’ engagement with classical music, attending stately homes, 
museums, art galleries, jazz, theatre and French restaurants. The maximum score which 
a respondent could obtain (if they ‘often’ engaged in all these activities) is 30. A second 
score is for ‘emerging’ cultural capital, which is based on the extent of a respondent’s 
engagement with video games, social network sites, the internet, playing sport, watching 
sport, spending time with friends, going to the gym, going to gigs and preferences for rap 
and rock. The maximum score here is 32.
Economic Capital
Finally, we have measures of economic capital. Here, we use three of our questions assess-
ing household income, household savings and house price; we standardise household 
Figure 1. Multiple correspondence analysis of cultural taste. 
Source: GfK nationally representative survey.
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savings and house prices and combine these standardised variables to generate an ‘assets’ 
variable. The distribution of these variables is shown in Table 4. We should emphasise 
here that these measures are for the household, and that it is possible that some individuals 
who are not in well-paid jobs actually achieve high scores because of the earnings of other 
household members. We think that a household measure is preferable because it is more 
likely to tap the economic resources available to individuals; nonetheless, there are likely 
to be issues of gender inequality (in particular) which will be opaque to such measures.
Table 3. Summary statistics for cultural capital.
GBCS – mean GBCS – σ GfK – mean GfK – σ
High culture score 13.2 4.6 10.3 4.9
Emerging culture 
score
18.1 4.8 13.5 6.3
Source: GfK and GBCS surveys.
Figure 2. Location of supplementary variables.
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A Latent Class Analysis of Social Class
As we explained in section 2, we are not developing a deductive class schema, but are 
instead seeking to most parsimoniously differentiate between our measures of economic, 
social and cultural capital to assess where the main class boundaries are placed. We 
therefore elaborate a bottom-up, inductive, approach: if our variables are those which 
are most important for distinguishing between social classes, following Bourdieu, what 
are the classes that emerge? Our method, latent class analysis, finds the most parsimoni-
ous way to group people to classes. Latent class analysis is based on the idea that some 
parameters of a statistical model differ across unobserved subgroups, which form the 
categories of a categorical latent variable. It can be distinguished from factor analysis, 
which identifies continuous latent variables. While latent class analysis is primarily used 
for the analysis of categorical data, it can also be used for clustering with continuous 
variables – such a clustering procedure tends to outperform other non-hierarchical 
cluster analysis such as k-means clustering (Vermunt and Magidson, 2003), and it is this 
method which we adopt here.10
We standardised the six variables specified in the previous section (mean status scores 
of contacts, total number of contacts, highbrow cultural capital, emerging cultural capi-
tal, income and assets), and we carried out a latent class analysis on this basis. In order 
to overcome the problem of sample skew, we combined cases from the GfK, for which 
we use the original weighting values, and the cases in the GBCS, which we weight with 
a value of 1/161400 for each case, so that combined they contribute the weight of a single 
case to the overall analysis. This means that the latent class analysis is derived from the 
nationally representative GfK survey, and that the results are not distorted by the unrep-
resentative web survey. However, the cases from the web survey can be classified within 
the same clusters as the cases from the nationally representative survey and hence we are 
able to allocate classes to all the respondents from the web-based GBCS derived from 
nationally representative data. The Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) is minimised at 
seven clusters (BIC = 12991.8): we therefore take this as our solution.
Our more sophisticated way of approaching class, looking at cultural, social and eco-
nomic capitals (using different measures of economic capital) produces a complex map 
of seven classes. Table 5 briefly identifies these seven main classes, and lists the propor-
tion of respondents from the GfK and GBCS who fit into these. Table 6 reports the 
detailed scores for each of the measures of capital associated with the latent classes. This 
is the bedrock of our analysis, and the rest of our article explicates and elaborates these 
seven classes.
Table 4. Summary statistics for economic capital.
GBCS – mean GBCS – σ GfK – mean GfK – σ
Household income  £52,766  £41,513  £31,856  £31,027
Property value £204,562 £181,650 £126,706 £127,875
Savings  £36,432  £60,411  £20,084  £47,185
Source: GfK and GBCS surveys.
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Table 5. Summary of social classes.
% GfK % GBCS Description
Elite 6 22 Very high economic capital (especially 
savings), high social capital, very high 
highbrow cultural capital
Established middle class 25 43 High economic capital, high status of 
mean contacts, high highbrow and 
emerging cultural capital
Technical middle class 6 10 High economic capital, very high mean 
social contacts, but relatively few 
contacts reported, moderate cultural 
capital
New affluent workers 15 6 Moderately good economic capital, 
moderately poor mean score of social 
contacts, though high range, moderate 
highbrow but good emerging cultural 
capital
Traditional working 
class
14 2 Moderately poor economic capital, 
though with reasonable house price, 
few social contacts, low highbrow and 
emerging cultural capital
Emergent service 
workers
19 17 Moderately poor economic capital, 
though with reasonable household 
income, moderate social contacts, 
high emerging (but low highbrow) 
cultural capital
Precariat 15 <1 Poor economic capital, and the lowest 
scores on every other criterion
Table 6. Seven latent classes.
Elite Established 
middle class
Technical 
middle class
New 
affluent 
workers
Traditional 
working 
class
Emergent 
service 
workers
Precariat
Household income £89,082 £47,184 £37,428 £29,252 £13,305 £21,048 £8,253
Household savings £142,458 £26,090 £65,844 £4,918 £9,500 £1,138 £793
House value £325,000 £176,834 £163,362 £128,639 £127,174 £17,968 £26,948
Social contact 
score
50.1 45.3 53.5 37.8 41.5 38.3 29.9
Social contact 
number
16.2 17.0 3.6 16.9 9.8 14.8 6.7
Highbrow cultural 
capital
16.9 13.7 9.2 6.9 10.8 9.6 6.0
Emerging cultural 
capital
14.4 16.5 11.4 14.8 6.5 17.5 8.4
Source: GfK nationally representative survey (with GBCS respondents included and weighted at 161,400th of 
a case).
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Our interpretations of these seven classes are aided by Table 7 which indicates the 
socio-demographic correlates of these latent classes (also based also on the nationally 
representative GfK survey). In addition, we also draw on the granular detail provided by 
the GBCS survey which allows us much more detailed information on the specific jobs 
and geographical locations of the seven classes.11 Table 8 indicates the eight occupations 
that are most over-represented for each of our seven classes, as well as the percentage of 
GBCS respondents in such occupations that fall into these classes. Table 8 thus allows 
the occupational profiles of our seven classes to be examined.
Table 7. Socio-demographic correlates of seven classes.
Elite Established 
middle class
Technical 
middle class
New 
affluent 
workers
Traditional 
working 
class
Emergent 
service 
workers
Precariat
Mean age 57 46 52 44 66 34 50
% female 50 54 59 43 62 55 57
% ethnic minority  4 13 9 11 9 21 13
% graduates 56 43 26 11 11 19 3
% with jobs in profs 
or management
63 51 35 22 31 20 9
% from prof or 
senior management 
families
52 41 40 19 17 22 5
Source: GfK nationally representative survey.
Table 8. Most ‘over-represented’ occupations in the seven classes.
Elite 21.8* N
Chief executive officers 60.5 4,953
IT and telecommunications directors 56.7 270
Marketing and sales directors 48.5 899
Functional managers and directors 46.0 782
Barristers and judges 45.1 532
Financial managers 44.6 1,167
Dental practitioners 44.4 169
Advertising and public relations directors 41.2 102
Established middle class 43.3  
Electrical engineers 60.2 128
Occupational therapists 59.7 134
Midwives 59.7 134
Environmental professionals 58.2 249
Police officers 56.8 470
Quality assurance and regulatory professionals 56.2 438
(Continued)
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Town planning officials 55.7 262
Special needs teaching professionals 55.5 173
Technical middle class 9.46  
Medical radiographers 17.1 117
Aircraft pilots 16.9 219
Pharmacists 16.2 278
Higher education teachers 15.8 994
Natural and social science professionals 15.6 1,413
Physical scientists 14.8 540
Senior professionals in education establishments 14.7 1,486
Business, research, and admin positions 14.6 1,051
New affluent workers  5.8  
Electricians and electrical fitters 19.1 247
Postal workers 16.5 266
Retail cashiers and checkout operatives 17.6 307
Plumbers and heating and ventilation engineers 17.2 116
Sales and retail assistants 14.7 2,961
Housing officers 14.4 146
Kitchen and catering assistants 13.9 704
Quality assurance technicians 14.4 111
Traditional working class 1.63  
Medical secretaries  7.2 167
Legal secretaries  6.5 123
Electrical and electronic technicians  5.7 123
Care workers  5.6 769
Cleaners  5.3 340
Van drivers  5.1 176
Electricians  4.8 210
Residential, day, and domiciliary care  4.8 104
Emergent service sector 17.3  
Bar staff 35.7 821
Chefs 35.4 234
Nursing auxiliaries and assistants 35.3 281
Assemblers and routine operatives 34.1 135
Care workers 33.9 769
Elementary storage occupations 33.0 291
Customer service occupations 31.7 1,450
Musicians 31.7 457
Precariat  0.7  
Cleaners  6.47 340
Van drivers  5.11 176
Care workers  4.03 769
Table 8. (Continued)
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Table 8. (Continued)
Carpenters and joiners 3.92 102
Caretakers 3.25 123
Leisure and travel service occupations 2.97 101
Shopkeepers and proprietors 2.53 158
Retail cashiers 2.28 307
Note: Only occupations with over 100 respondents are included. *% of GBCS respondents placed in this 
class. Source: GBCS.
These resources together allow us an unusually fine-grained and detailed way of inter-
preting the key characteristics of these classes. This is especially important in allowing 
us to move beyond a simple profiling of the differences between the classes to explicate 
the sociological processes that they reveal. To put the issue bluntly, we need to pull out 
sociologically meaningful class groups in order to demonstrate that our latent class anal-
ysis is producing relevant findings.
Before introducing our seven classes we need to reiterate that our method of defining 
class boundaries, drawing on measures of cultural, social and economic capital, is very 
different from that used in constructing the NS-SEC, and hence the two schemes do not 
compete directly with each other. However, to draw out the distinctive features of our 
model of class, we reflect on the different kinds of measures of class which they both 
articulate, and we therefore do comment on how ‘our’ class boundaries appear somewhat 
different to those which are evident from the NS-SEC.
Class 1: Elite
These are, on all dimensions, the most advantaged and privileged group in the UK. They 
are characterised by having the highest levels of every form of capital. Their mean 
household income is £89k, almost double that of the next highest class, and the average 
house price is £325k, considerably higher than any other class. Their average savings are 
also exceptionally high, well over double that of any other class. Fundamentally, this is 
a wealthy class, set apart from the other six classes on the basis of their economic 
advantages.
The elite have close to the highest number of social contacts, though partly for this 
reason their mean status score is not the highest of all the classes, but the second highest 
(since if one knows a large number of people, this makes it more likely for them to know 
both high and low status people). They also score the highest on ‘highbrow’ cultural 
capital, though by a less marked margin than for their economic capital, and they have 
moderately high scores on emerging cultural capital – so it would be unwise to just see 
them as highbrow.
Table 7 also reveals how membership of the elite is associated with other social 
advantages. They have the lowest proportion of ethnic minorities, the highest proportion 
of graduates, and over half come from families where the main earner was in senior 
management or the professions. They are clearly a relatively exclusive grouping, with 
restricted upward mobility into its ranks.
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Table 8 underscores the occupational narrowness of this group. There are major 
over-representations of (especially) chief executive officers, IT directors, marketing 
and sales directors, financial managers and management consultants, along with elite 
professions of dentists and barristers. Graduates of elite universities are over-repre-
sented amongst their ranks, especially from Oxford, City, Kings College London, LSE, 
Cambridge, Bristol, London South Bank, Imperial College and Trinity College 
Dublin.13 Strikingly, six of these universities are located in London, only Trinity is 
from outside the south of England. Geographically (see Figure 3), their residences are 
all over-represented in the south east of England, and especially in areas close to 
London in the affluent Home counties.
Our findings thus clearly demonstrate the power of a relatively small, socially and 
spatially exclusive group at the apex of British society, whose economic wealth sets them 
apart from the great majority of the population. This finding allows us the prospect of 
re-integrating class analysis with the study of elites in a way which has not been possible 
over recent decades where no elite class was distinguished within the EGP, although its 
existence was recognised (Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992: 40).
Class 2: Established middle class
This second most advantaged class has a household income of £47k a year, owns a 
relatively expensive house worth £177k, and has moderately good savings of £26k. 
These are all good scores for economic capital and it competes with the technical middle 
class in being the second best well-off class. This is a much larger class than the elite, 
with a quarter of the population in its ranks, and might be seen as the comfortably off 
bulwark of British society, even though they do not share the extreme wealth of the elite. 
It might be seen as comprising the bulk of what Goldthorpe (1982; Goldthorpe et al., 
1980) identifies as the professional and managerial ‘service class’; it has a higher 
proportion of members working in management and the professions than any other 
class except the elite.
They have more social contacts (17) than any other social class and these tend to be 
high status (the third highest of any class). This therefore appears to be the most gregari-
ous class, especially with other generally high status people (see Erikson, 1996). They 
are also highly culturally engaged, both for highbrow culture (the second highest scores), 
and also emerging cultural capital (also second). This is therefore a culturally omnivo-
rous and well-off group, with strong social connections. Its members are highly secure 
across all three forms of capital, though they lack the marked wealth of the elite.
Table 7 shows that they also have a high proportion of graduates amongst their 
ranks, and a majority of their members work in the professions or management. They 
also tend to come from professional and managerial families. However, in some areas 
they are more open than the elite, especially with a higher representation amongst 
ethnic minorities.
Occupationally, this class does not see such marked over-representations of specific 
occupations as does the elite, though there are modestly high profiles for professionals 
working in public service, with some managerial jobs also scoring highly (see Table 8). 
However, in no case are these occupations more than 50 per cent more likely to be in this 
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class than the GBCS as a whole, confirming that this class is recruited from a fairly broad 
occupational range. Educationally, a relatively large number of members are graduates. 
Geographically, the residences of this group tend to be located outside the south east of 
England, and mainly away from large towns or urban environments (see Figure 4). This 
is a ‘provincial’ formation, and is a sizeable bulwark of ‘middle England’: comfortably 
off, secure, and established.
Figures 3–9. Maps of each of seven latent classes. 
Source: GBCS.
Figure 3. Map of Elite social class. 
Source: GBCS.
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Class 3: Technical middle class
This class is sociologically much more distinctive and original to our analysis. It is quite 
small, with only 6 per cent of the national population, but is relatively prosperous, with 
good mean household incomes (£38k), excellent household savings (£66k) and houses 
worth considerable amounts of money (£163k). It competes with the established middle 
class to be the second most prosperous class in terms of economic capital. This is clearly 
a prosperous group with a secure economic position in British society.
Figure 4. Map of Established middle class. 
Source: GBCS.
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Socially and culturally, however, it is much more restricted than the established mid-
dle class. It reports the lowest number of social contacts of any of the classes (an aston-
ishingly low average of four out of 34 possible contacts, compared to 17 for the 
established middle class), though these do tend to be high status. Its social circle is much 
more restricted than other social classes, and it presumably socialises nearly exclusively 
with other professional experts. This is an interesting riposte to those who think it is the 
poor or disadvantaged whose social networks are the most restricted. In fact, it is this 
comfortably off technical middle class who are by far the most limited here. Culturally, 
it also scores relatively low for both highbrow and emerging cultural capital and there-
fore appears to be relatively culturally disengaged. This class is distinguished by its rela-
tive social isolation as well as its cultural apathy.
Table 7 shows that it has a lower proportion of graduates and of employees in the 
professions and management, though the levels of over-representation are also relatively 
modest, and much less marked than for the elite. Aircraft pilots, for instance, are 78 per 
cent more likely to be in this class than in the GBCS as a whole. This seems therefore to 
be a group who has achieved good economic rewards often without distinctive creden-
tials, or through working in established middle-class jobs. Perhaps surprisingly, it has an 
above-average proportion of women (59%).
We can obtain more detail by using the GBCS to focus our understanding of its pro-
file. There is an over-representation of those doing research, scientific and technical 
forms of work (see Table 8). Amongst those graduates who are located within it, there are 
over-representations from established and prestigious universities with strong reputa-
tions for science, including Warwick, Cambridge, UCL, Southampton and Imperial. 
There is also a slight over-representation of graduates in science and technology. 
Members of this class are geographically located in the South East where scientific and 
technical jobs are likely to be found (Figure 5), but shun the centre of London and tend 
to be located in suburban locations (perhaps consistent with their social isolation?).
We might see this class therefore as a group of scientifically and technically oriented 
people who have used their skills to gain reasonably secure and well-rewarded work, but 
who might not be seen as part of a more established middle class. Even though they are 
as likely as the established middle class to come from middle-class families, their degree 
of social and cultural disengagement is marked. We could see this group as indication of 
Savage’s (2010) argument that in the second half of the 20th century we have witnessed 
the emergence of a distinctive technical group somewhat at odds with the larger section 
of the middle classes who are more oriented towards the arts and humanities.
Class 4: New affluent workers
This class scores highly on ‘emerging’ cultural capital, but scores low on highbrow cul-
tural capital. It therefore seems to shun established forms of cultural capital though it is 
not culturally disengaged. Its household income is moderate, and its house value (£129k) 
is relatively high, and it has a small amount of savings. It is therefore economically 
secure without being very well off. Its members score the second highest on their number 
of social contacts, though the status scores tend to be moderate. Overall, this class scores 
moderately well on all three capitals, with a particular penchant for emerging cultural 
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capital. They are a socially and culturally active class, whose economic capital is higher 
than for any class apart from the elite or two middle-class groupings.
Table 7 reveals some intriguing aspects of this group. They tend to come from non-
middle-class families, and few have been to university. They are the most male of any of 
our seven classes, with 57 per cent being men. Amongst its relatively few members who 
are graduates, there are over-representations of graduates from some new universities 
Figure 5. Map of Technical middle class. 
Source: GBCS.
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(such as Liverpool Hope, Bolton, or the University of West England). As we might 
expect, it has a high proportion of young people. There is a considerable over-represen-
tation of various white collar and blue collar jobs, though largely in the private sector and 
in customer facing occupations: however, since only 5.4 per cent of the GBCS are in this 
class, only a modest proportion of these occupations (such as electricians and postal 
workers) are located in this class. They tend to be over-represented in old manufacturing 
centres of the UK, located outside the south east of England (see Figure 6).
Figure 6. Map of New affluent workers. 
Source: GBCS.
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This is a group whose members have not benefitted from conventional routes through 
education to middle-class positions, but have nonetheless achieved relatively secure 
economic positions and are also relatively socially and culturally engaged. They seem to 
have achieved their relative security without major inherited resources of economic or 
cultural capital. They actually form a significant part of the population, at 15 per cent, but 
cannot easily be identified as either middle or working class. We have used the term ‘new 
affluent workers’, with a nod to Goldthorpe and Lockwood’s famous studies from the 
1960s, to capture this complex and ambivalent role and sensitise us to the need to 
understand this as an unusually fluid grouping.
Class 5: Traditional working class
With class 5, we now move onto clearly less advantaged classes. Class 5 is a moderately 
poor class, with a mean household income of only £13k. However, its members predomi-
nantly own their homes, with an average house price of £127k, but it reports only 
modest savings. The range of social contacts is quite restricted at only 10, and the aver-
age status scores are moderate. Scores on highbrow cultural capital are moderate, and 
scores on emerging cultural capital are particularly low. This class therefore scores low 
on nearly every measure of capital, though is not completely deprived.
This class has few graduates, and traditional working-class occupations are over-
represented amongst its number (e.g. lorry drivers, cleaners, electricians), as are 
some menial white collar occupations (e.g. legal and medical secretaries). This over-
representation is considerable but since less than 2 per cent of the GBCS falls into 
this class, the absolute proportions are low and the occupations in Table 7 are indicative 
only. This class is predominantly female, more than any other class. Insofar as particular 
universities are over-represented, these are ones which tend to recruit mature or part-time 
students (such as Birkbeck and the Open University). It is strongly over-represented 
amongst old industrial areas outside the south east of England, especially in Scotland, 
Wales and Northern Ireland (see Figure 7).
It is for these reasons that we might see this class as a residue of earlier historical 
periods, and embodying characteristics of the ‘traditional working class’. We might 
see it as a ‘throwback’ to an earlier phase in Britain’s social history, as part of an older 
generational formation.
Class 6: Emergent service workers
This has a modest household income of £21k, but is likely to rent and only has limited 
savings. This class does have a significant number of social contacts, who tend to be 
moderate in their status scores. The emerging cultural capital is higher for this class than 
for any other class, indicating a high degree of cultural engagement in youthful musical, 
sporting and internet activities, but highbrow cultural capital is low. This is therefore a 
marginal class in terms of its economic capital, but its social and cultural capital is high.
This class is relatively young, with a mean age of 34. There is an unusually high pro-
portion of ethnic minorities within it. Its members tend not to be graduates or to come 
from middle-class families, yet they are very different from the traditional working class 
in being more culturally engaged with emerging cultural capital. They work in a variety 
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of occupations, usually in the service sector, such as bar work, chefs, customer service 
occupations and call centre workers. This appears therefore to be a class of people who 
are ‘making their way’ in a range of relatively insecure occupations.
Educationally, those graduates who fall into their ranks include over-representations 
from well-known universities specialising in arts and humanities such as Goldsmiths, 
York,12 Birkbeck and SOAS, and indeed arts and humanities graduates are generally 
Figure 7. Map of Traditional working class. 
Source: GBCS.
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over-represented. This is very much an ‘urban’ grouping, with its members tending to 
live in cheaper locations within large cities, especially in the centre of London, and also 
in university towns (such as Aberystwyth or York) (see Figure 8).
In labelling this class, we decided to use the term ‘emergent service workers’, to 
recognise the extent to which they are a youthful grouping with high amounts of 
emergent cultural capital.
Figure 8. Map of Emergent service workers. 
Source: GBCS.
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Class 7: Precariat
This is economically the poorest class, with a household income of only £8k, negligible 
savings, and they are likely to rent. Their social range is small with an average of seven 
contacts whose mean status is the lowest of any of the classes. The scores for both high-
brow and emerging cultural capital are the lowest and second lowest, respectively, of any 
of the classes. This is clearly the most deprived of the classes that we have identified, on 
all measures, yet they form a relatively large social class, with 15 per cent of the 
population.
They are located in old industrial areas, but often away from the large urban areas. 
Stoke on Trent stands out as having a high over-representation, but London and the South 
East tends to score low (see Figure 9). Its members are unlikely to have attended univer-
sity. Occupationally they are over-represented amongst the unemployed, van drivers, 
cleaners, carpenters, care workers, cashiers and postal workers, and they also include 
shopkeepers.
We use the term precariat in line with recent commentaries (Standing, 2011) and as a 
reflection on the existence of a significant group characterised by high amounts of inse-
curity on all of our measures of capital.
Conclusion
In this article we have developed a new model of class in contemporary Britain. We 
should emphasise that this is a different kind of model to that developed by Goldthorpe 
and embedded in the NS-SEC, since it is an inductive, rather than deductive class schema. 
The two models are thus not in direct competition with each other, as we are not seeking 
to develop a better occupational- or employment-based measure of class. Rather, our 
model is designed to shed more light on how cultural and social boundaries operate in 
Britain and how this might suggest new lines of class division – an issue which the 
NS-SEC is less suitable for. Although our analysis here is necessarily quantitative, given 
our data, we would hope that it might cross fertilise with qualitative research to produce 
a more developed multi-dimensional approach.
We need to reiterate that our analysis is dependent on the measures used to construct 
the indicators of capitals. This is an obvious point which nonetheless needs to be under-
scored. Our measures of economic capital are relatively straightforward and should not 
cause undue concern, though we need to note that our use of measures of household 
income will obscure divisions within households and therefore that the relationships 
between gender and class will not be fully registered here. Our measures of social capi-
tal, using the widely validated Cambridge scores, are uncontroversial (Stewart et al., 
1973). On the other hand, our use of measures both of ‘highbrow’ and ‘emergent’ cultural 
capital provides a more nuanced understanding of cultural boundaries in the UK than 
might be evident from a more orthodox Bourdieusian focus on high culture alone. The 
extent to which such ‘emerging’ forms of activity represent a robust form of ‘capital’, 
which might compete with more established and legitimate forms, is an interesting find-
ing which warrants further investigation.
Let us conclude by comparing our findings with more familiar measures of social 
class, to draw out the wider implications of our model. Firstly, although, as we have 
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discussed, there are clear occupational profiles which map onto our seven classes, the fit 
is by no means clear. Given the way we have constructed our model, this is not necessar-
ily surprising. Nonetheless, it suggests the need for caution towards those exercises, such 
as those of Grusky and Weeden (2001, 2008), which focus on micro-classes whereby 
specific occupations are clearly differentiated from each other. Leaving aside the 
Figure 9. Map of Precariat. 
Source: GBCS.
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particular case of chief executive officers who are predominantly located in our ‘elite’, 
we have found no clear affiliation between specific occupations and our latent classes. 
Perhaps, rather than seeking to locate class fundamentally in occupational ‘blocks’, the 
time is now ripe for a different, multi-dimensional perspective, in which occupational 
membership is spread (though unevenly) between different classes.
Secondly, it is striking that we have been able to discern a distinctive elite, whose 
sheer economic advantage sets it apart from other classes. Although this is not neces-
sarily surprising, our analysis is the first time that this group has been elaborated 
within a wider analysis of the class structure, in which they are normally placed 
alongside a larger group of professionals and managers. Our finding here is an impor-
tant critical intervention against the deployment of the ‘service class’ concept, which 
has failed to recognise the distinctiveness of elite groups within its number (see 
Savage and Williams, 2008), even though it does recognise the difference between an 
upper and lower service class. The fact that this elite group is shown to have the most 
privileged backgrounds also is an important demonstration of the accentuation of 
social advantage at the top of British society.
Thirdly, at the opposite extreme, we have discerned the existence of a sizeable 
group – 15 per cent of the population – which is marked by the lack of any significant 
amount of economic, cultural, or social capital. We have identified these as the ‘pre-
cariat’. The recognition of the existence of this group, along with the elite, is a power-
ful reminder that our conventional approaches to class have hindered our recognition 
of these two extremes, which occupy a very distinctive place in British society.
Fourthly, only two of our seven classes conform to older sociological models of ‘mid-
dle’ and ‘working’ class. We might see this as some evidence of a blurring and fragmen-
tation of conventional ‘middle’ and ‘working’ class boundaries. Of course, the nature of 
the class boundaries between middle and working class has been much discussed in 
previous studies of occupational classes, as with the debate about the ‘labour aristocracy’, 
and ‘white collar workers’. Our way of interpreting these boundaries is to suggest that 
the ‘established middle class’ epitomises the characteristics of ‘service class’ as elabo-
rated by John Goldthorpe (1982). As Goldthorpe anticipates, this is a large class, indeed 
the largest single class in our analysis, with a quarter of the population belonging to it. To 
this degree, the stable middle class are indeed a large group in British society. It does 
come over as secure and established across all our measures of capital.
The traditional working class might also appear to be its counterpart: the surviving 
rump of the working class, but they now only comprise 14 per cent of the population, and 
are relatively old, with an average age of 65. To this extent, the traditional working class 
is fading from contemporary importance, and clearly is less prominent than the estab-
lished middle class.
However, only 39 per cent of the national population fall into these two classes, 
which conform most closely to these middle and working-class sociological stereo-
types. Instead, the majority fall into classes which have not been registered by more 
conventional approaches to class, and require a more fluid understanding of the 
redrawing of social and cultural boundaries in recent years. Several of the classes thus 
have over-representations from white collar and blue collar jobs. The ‘collar’ line is 
of little value in unravelling these patterns.
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Fifthly, some of these new classes do not embody conventional cultural or social capi-
tal, yet appear to have obtained moderate levels of economic capital. Here, a conven-
tional Bourdieusian analysis which focuses unduly on the reproduction of educational 
advantage misses the way that both the new affluent workers and the emergent service 
workers have acquired certain levels of economic and social capital without access to 
conventional highbrow culture.
The technical middle class are also a powerful reminder that not all those with eco-
nomic capital have extensive social networks, and the new affluent workers are revealing 
too as an interstitial class. We are thus able to challenge the perception that the problem of 
social and cultural engagement is more marked at the lower levels of the class structure.
The ‘new affluent workers’ and the ‘emergent service workers’ are an interesting 
focus. They seem, in many respects, to be the children of the ‘traditional working class’, 
and they might thus be said to exemplify the stark break in working-class culture which 
has been evident as a result of de-industrialisation, mass unemployment, immigration 
and the restructuring of urban space. They show high levels of engagement with ‘emerg-
ing cultural capital’ and have extensive social networks, so indicating that they are far 
from being disengaged in any conventional sense. To this extent, new social formations 
appear to be emerging out of the tendrils of the traditional working class.
Finally, in conclusion, our new model of class offers a powerful way of comprehend-
ing the persistence, yet also the remaking of social class divisions in contemporary 
Britain. Our multi-dimensional analysis reveals the polarisation of social inequality (in 
the form of an elite and a precariat), and the fragmentation of traditional sociological 
middle and working-class divisions into more segmented forms. We have been able to 
mine down into unusual detail about the educational and occupational profiles of these 
classes (and our future publications will do this further). We hope that our new model of 
class will prove a valuable resource for future social researchers in exploring the com-
plex and multi-dimensional nature of social class inequality in the UK in a way which 
permits us to recognise the ongoing salience of social class divisions in the stratification 
of British society.
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Notes
 1. Occasionally, as a nested construction, the class schema was operationalised as having both 
11 and three classes.
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 2. In some of his work Goldthorpe notes that intermediate occupations are in a ‘mixed position’, 
but this qualification does not change his insistence on the primary differentiation between 
those on service and labour contracts.
 3. There are some exceptions which do explore the relationship between class and income, mor-
tality, health and low-weight births (see Rose and Pevalin, 2003).
 4. A log-linear model describes the effect(s) or the interaction(s) that are needed in order to 
give the best possible description of the joint distribution in a two-, three- or multi-way 
contingency table, and are also widely used in the analysis of mobility tables. Table cells 
with extreme cell frequencies can, however, make it difficult to identify the model that best 
describes the distribution (see Bishop et al., 1975; Wickens, 1989).
 5. There is an extensive debate on the theorisation of class which we do not have the space to 
cover here, but see Bennett et al. (2008), Devine (2010) and Savage (2000).
 6. Strictly speaking, these are not NS-SEC classes, but occupational categories of the NS-SEC 
self-coding procedure that was used on the GBCS.
 7. MCA is a form of principal components analysis for categorical data which shows the posi-
tion of modalities as points in an N-dimensional space and can therefore be readily interpreted 
(see Le Roux and Rouanet, 2010).
 8. There is an extensive debate on the measurement and theorisation of cultural engagement and dis-
engagement (e.g. Bennett et al., 2008). Here, we would reiterate that engagement is defined only 
by the measures we used in the survey, and should not therefore be taken as an absolute definition.
 9. Our delineation of ‘emerging’ cultural capital is provocative and requires more research to 
substantiate it as a form of capital. We do not claim to know the precise social advantage 
conferred by such emerging cultural practices, and are aware that it may be more legitimate 
styles or genres within these popular cultural practices, rather than the entire cultural form, 
that represent a form of ‘capital’ (Friedman, 2011).
10. Strictly speaking, this means that we used ‘latent profile analysis’.
11. Care is needed here. Our inspection of the GBCS indicates little selection bias differences 
between professional and managerial occupations, or between types of universities, and 
therefore our comparisons between these kinds of occupations, and different universities, are 
robust. However, because GBCS respondents in routine and semi-routine jobs are untypical 
of their peers, more caution is needed to extrapolate to occupations in the lower social classes. 
We draw attention to this point where relevant below.
12. The GBCS data include details on specific universities attended. We do not report this aspect 
of the data fully here as it will be the subject of further, more detailed accounts.
13. Care needs to be taken in interpreting results from the University of York, since the average 
age of respondents from York is considerably lower than for other universities, and hence may 
cause selection bias effects.
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